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GASPAR AVILA, 
Petitioner and Appellant, Appellate Court Docket No.: 
vs. 2016-0612-CA 
TAYLORSVILLE CITY, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
--------- -----------00000--------------------
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals possesses jurisdiction to hear this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ("UCA"), § 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Petitioner Argues That His PCRA Petition Was Timely Filed 
GASP AR A VILA ("Petitioner"), argues that after reviewing the pleadings, 
proffer, and evidence, on May 2 7, 2016, the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake Department, (hereinafter referred to as the "Court"), incorrectly determined 
that Petitioner's Petition For Relief Under The Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
("PCRA"), was untimely filed. 1&2 
1 Please refer to the Order Granting Summary Judgment And Denying Petitioner 
Relief at pages 1 71-172 of the record. 
2 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 186-253 of the record. 
1 
The issue was appropriately preserved via the following: ( 1) Petitioner's 
~ PCRA Petition and its accompanying Memorandum; 3 (2) Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion; 4 and (3) Petitioner's oral 
arguments presented to the Court at all of the court hearings held on this matter.5 
The appropriate appellate review standard to contest the Court's incorrect 
ruling that Petitioner's PCRA Petition was untimely is based on the following 
holding from the Gordon court, 
"We review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition 
for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the 
lower court's conclusions of law. Likewise we review a grant of 
summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the lower 
court. We will affirm such a decision when the record shows that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making this 
assessment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," 
(citations and quotations omitted). Gordon v. State, 2016 UT App 
190, ,r 13, 382 P.3d 1063. 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this issue of the 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-107, Statute of limitations for postconviction 
relief. 
3 Please refer to pages 1-69 of the record. 
4 Please refer to pages 116-125 of the record. 
5 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 186-253 of the record. 
2 
( 1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of 
the following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction 
over the case, if an appeal is taken; " 
( c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari 
is filed; ~ 
( d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of 
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of 
certiorari is filed; 
( e) the date on which petitioner lmew or should have known, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; 
or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(f) 
is established. 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner 
was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the 
United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The 
petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that (j/ 
the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection, (3). 
( 4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of 
a petition asserting: ~ 
3 
2. 
3. 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or 
(b) factual innocence under Section 788-9-40 l. 
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the 
limitations period established in this section. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 358, 2008 General Session 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. [Courts open -- Redress of 
injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
II. Petitioner Argues That The Court Inappropriately Granted Summary 
Judgment 
Petitioner argues that after reviewing the pleadings, proffer, and evidence, 
on May 27, 2016, the Court incorrectly granted Taylorsville City's (the "City") 
motion for summary judgment.6&7 
6 Please refer to the Order Granting Summary Judgment And Denying Petitioner 
Relief at pages 171-172 of the record. 
7 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 186-253 of the record. 
4 
The issue was appropriately preserved via the following: ( 1) Petitioner's 
PCRA Petition and its accompanying Memorandum; 8 (2) Petitioner's 
Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion;9 and (3) Petitioner's oral 
arguments presented to the Court at all of the court hearings held on this matter. 10 
The appropriate appellate review standard to contest the Court's incorrect 
ruling that granted the City's motion for summary judgment is based on the 
following holding from the Lucky Seven court, 
"In reviewing a summary judgment, we apply the analytical standard 
required of the trial court. We liberally construe the facts and view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Moreover, because a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, we are free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusion. After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material issue of fact, 
we must reverse the trial court's determination and remand for trial on 
that issue. It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts 
in ruling on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling. One sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the 
entry of summary judgment," ( citations and quotations omitted). Lucky 
Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this issue of the 
appeal are as follows: 
8 Please refer to pages 1-69 of the record. 
9 Please refer to pages 116-125 of the record. 
10 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 186-253 of the record. 
5 
1. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. [Courts open -- Redress of 
injuries.] 
2. 
.., 
.) . 
All comts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 . 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) Motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A party 
may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the 
part of each claim or defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the moving patty shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons 
for granting or denying the motion. The motion and memoranda must follow 
Rule 1 as supplemented below. 
(a)(l) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 1, a motion for summary 
judgment must contain a statement of material facts claimed not to be 
genuinely disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered 
paragraphs and supported by citing to materials in the record under 
paragraph ( c )( 1) of this rule. 
(a)(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule 1, a memorandum 
opposing the motion must include a verbatim restatement of each of the 
6 
moving party's facts that is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for 
the dispute supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph 
( c )( 1) of this rule. The memorandum may contain a separate statement of 
additional materials facts in dispute, which must be separately stated in 
numbered paragraphs and similarly supported. 
(a)(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a 
concise statement of facts, whether disputed or undisputed, for the limited 
purpose of providing background and context for the case, dispute and 
motion. 
(a)( 4) Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum 
opposing the motion under paragraphs (a)( I) and ( a )(2) that is not disputed 
is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion. 
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, 
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move 
for summary judgment at any time after service of a motion for summary 
judgment by the adverse party or after 21 days from the commencement of 
the action. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may move for summary 
judgment at any time. Unless the court orders otherwise, a party may file a 
motion for summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the 
close of all discovery. 
( c) Procedures. 
( c )( 1) Supporting factual positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be 
genuinely disputed or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 
( c )(1 )(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 
7 
declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion 
only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 
( c )( 1 )(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or 
presence of a genuine dispute. 
( c )(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party 
may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be 
presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence. 
( c )(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, 
but it may consider other materials in the record. 
( c )( 4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support 
or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, must set out facts 
that would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant or 
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. 
( d) When facts are unavailable to the nonmoving party. If a nonmoving patty 
shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present 
facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: 
( d)( 1) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice; 
( d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or 
( d)(3) issue any other appropriate order. 
( e) Failing to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly 
support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's 
assertion of fact as required by paragraph ( c ), the court may: 
( e )( 1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 
( e )(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 
8 
( e )(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-
including the facts considered undisputed-show that the moving party is 
entitled to it; or 
( e )( 4) issue any other appropriate order. 
(t) Judgment independent of the motion. After giving notice and a 
reasonable time to respond, the court may: 
( t)( 1) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party; 
(t)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or 
( t)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties 
material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute. 
(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the 
relief requested by the motion, it may enter an order stating any material 
fact-including an item of damages or other relief-that is not genuinely in 
dispute and treating the fact as established in the case. 
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an 
affidavit or declaration under this rule is submitted in bad faith or solely for 
delay, the court-after notice and a reasonable time to respond-may order 
the submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, it incurred as a result. The court may also hold an 
offending party or attorney in contempt or order other appropriate sanctions. 
4. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1 l(e). 
( e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
( e )( 1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
9 
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( e )(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
( e )(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open 
court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of 
defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
( e )( 4 )(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that 
the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction; 
( e )( 5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
( e )( 6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
( e )(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea; and ( e )(8) the defendant has been advised that the right 
of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated 
to the defendant. 
10 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a comt is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case 
This appeal is based on: (1) the Court's incorrect determination that 
Petitioner untimely filed his PCRA Petition; and (2) the Court's incorrect ruling 
· h c· , · c · d 11&12 grantmg t e rty s motion 1or summary JU gment. 
II. Course Of Proceedings 
On February 27, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty plea to Driving Under The 
Influence Of ALC/Drugs, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation ofUCA § 41-6A-
502.13 On December 8, 2015, Petitioner filed his PCRA Petition and its 
accompanying Memorandum. 14 On February 12, 2016, the City filed its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 15 On March 14, 2016, Petitioner filed the Memorandum 
in Response to Respondent's Motion. 16 On May 27, 2016, there was a court 
hearing on the above-mentioned pleadings. 17 On June 2, 2016, there was a 
11 Please refer to the Order Granting Summary Judgment And Denying Petitioner 
Relief at pages 171-172 of the record. 
12 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 186-253 of the record. 
13 Please refer to pages 23-28 of the record. 
14 Please refer to pages 1-69 of the record. 
15 Please refer to p;ges 84-113 of the record. 
16 Please refer to pages 116-125 of the record. 
17 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 213-244 of the record. 
11 
telephonic conference on the above-mentioned pleadings. 18 At the conclusion of 
vj said hearings, the Court ruled that Petitioner's PCRA Petition was untimely filed, 
d d h C · , · .c • d I 9& ?O an grante t e 1ty s mot10n 1or summary JU gment. -
III. Statement Of Facts 
l. On February 27, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to Driving Under The Influence 
Of ALC/Drugs, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of UCA § 41-6A-
502_21 
2. Petitioner timely filed his PCRA Petition on December 8, 201 s.22,23,24&25 
3. Petitioner presented disputed material facts to the Court, which requires the 
C d h C. , . .c • d 26 n 28&29 ourt to eny t e 1ty s mot10n 1or summary JU gment. ·- · 
18 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 245-253 of the record. 
19 Please refer to the Order Granting Summary Judgment And Denying Petitioner 
Relief at pages 1 71-172 of the record. 
20 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 213-253 of the record. 
21 Please refer to pages 23-28 of the record. 
22 Please refer to Petitioner's PCRA Memorandum, at pages 17-20 of the record. 
23 Please refer to Petitioner's Affidavit, at pages 30-31 of the record. 
24 Please refer to Petitioner's Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion, 
at pages 120-124 of the record. 
25 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 213-253 of the record. 
26 Please refer to Petitioner's PCRA Memorandum, at pages 9-69 of the record 
27 Please refer to Petitioner's Affidavit, at pages 30-31 of the record. 
28 Please refer to Petitioner's Memorandum in Response to Respondent's Motion, at 
pages 116-125 of the record. 
29 Please refer to the transcripts at pages 213-253 of the record. 
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I. 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
Marshaling The Evidence Is Not Required As Petitioner Is Not 
Challenging The Evidence, But Rather The Court's Legal Conclusions 
Drawn Therefrom 
The Utah Auto court held, 
"Utah Auto is not challenging the evidence underlying the court's 
decision, but the legal conclusions drawn therefrom. Thus, Utah Auto 
need not marshal." Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Comm'n, 2008 UT 
App 29, n. 4, 191 P.3d 1252. 
In regard to marshalling, the Nielsen court held, 
"Too often, the appellee's brief is focused on this latter point, and not 
enough on the ultimate merits of the case. To encourage the latter and 
discourage the former, we also hereby repudiate the requirements of 
playing devil's advocate and of presenting every scrap of competent 
evidence in a comprehensive and fastidious order. That formulation is 
nowhere required in the rule. And its principal impact on briefing has 
been to incentivize appellees to conduct a fastidious review of the 
record in the hope of identifying a scrap of evidence the appellant may 
have overlooked. That is not the point of the marshaling rule, and will 
no longer be an element of our consideration of it," ( citations and 
quotations omitted). State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,143,326 P.3d 
645. 
Here, marshalling is not required, pursuant to Utah Auto, because Petitioner 
is not challenging the evidence underlying the court's decision, but the legal 
conclusions drawn therefrom. Notwithstanding, Petitioner lists all of the evidence 
provided to the Court as follows: (I) Petitioner's court docket for case number 
13 
061117770;30 (2) Petitioner's Affidavit;31 (3) the English translation of the 
~ Waiver;32 (4) the Spanish Waiver;33 (4) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
l l(e) 2007;34 (5) a copy of Pinder v. State;35 and (6) a copy of Petitioner's request 
for discovery. 36 
After reviewing said evidence, Petitioner did not discover any new evidence 
that he may have overlooked, as required by Nielsen. Accordingly, Petitioner 
prays the Appellate Court to determine that Petitioner's marshalling is sufficient, 
thereby allowing the Appellate Court to consider the merits of Petitioner's appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Court Incorrectly Determined That Petitioner's PCRA Petition 
Was Untimely Pursuant To UCA § 78B-9-107 
In relation to the PCRA timeliness issues the Pinder court held, 
"Our cases establish that a defendant could have raised a claim when he 
or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it," 
(quotations omitted). Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ~ 44, 367 P.3d 968. 
The Lovell court held, 
"we held that because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11 ( e) 
... the law places the burden of establishing compliance with those 
30 Please refer to pages 23-28 of the record. 
31 Please refer to pages 30-31 of the record. 
32 Please refer to pages 35-41 of the record. 
33 Please refer to pages 42-45 of the record. 
34 Please refer to pages 4 7-49 of the record. 
35 Please refer to pages 51-65 of the record. 
36 Please refer to pages 67-69 of the record . 
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requirements on the trial judge. The trial judge must fulfill the ... 
requirements imposed by [rule 1 l(e)] on the record before accepting 
the guilty plea. Although rule 11 ( e) does not require the judge to 
personally address the defendant regarding the rights the defendant is 
waiving, our cases impose a duty on the trial judge under rule 11 ( e) to 
determine that a defendant has been affirmatively advised of the rights 
he is waiving," (citations and quotations omitted). State v. Lovell, • 
2011 UT 36, ~ 12, 262 P.3d 803. 
Here, the Taylorsville Justice Court (the "Plea Court"), possessed the duty to 
comply with Rule 1 l(e) pursuant to Lovell. However, the Plea Court failed to 
comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11 ( e ), thereby violating 
Petitioner's constitutional right to due process. 37 Petitioner reasonably relied on the ~ 
Plea Court's disposition of his matter as being appropriate and constitutionally valid. 
At no point did Petitioner have any reason to believe that the Plea Court violated his 
constitutional right to due process because it failed to abide by Rule 11 ( e ). 
As such, it is impossible for Petitioner to file an appeal, nor could he have 
raised a claim regarding the Plea Court's failure to comply with Rule ll(e), because 
he was not aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it. 
The Court's incorrect ruling is based on the unrealistic idea that Petitioner, 
who was not represented by counsel, and is a lay person, was aware of Rule 1 l(e) 
and its constitutional implications on the day he pied guilty. Most attorneys are 
unaware of Rule l l(e), unless they practice criminal law on a regular basis. For 
37 As completely described below. 
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this exact scenario, the legislature carved out an exception in UCA § 78-B-
9(107)(2)( e ), which states in pertinent pati, 
"for purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest 
of the following dates: the date on which petitioner knew or should 
have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary 
facts on which the petition is based." 
Said statue is further buttressed by a large volume of case law that protects 
I@ Petitioner's right to due process via Rule 11 ( e ). Said case law equitably states that 
if a defendant's constitutional right to due process is violated via Rule l l(e), then 
the court must withdraw the plea and vacate the sentence, otherwise the court 
abuses its discretion.38 
Common sense and equity dictates that Petitioner be allowed to file his PCRA 
Petition within the one year period of when he became aware that his constitutional 
right to due process was violated by the Plea Court. Therefore, it is appropriate for 
the Appellate Court to remand with instructions to the Court that Petitioner's PCRA 
Petition was timely filed. Further, this disputed fact of timeliness, in and of itself, is 
sufficient for the Court to deny the City's motion for summary judgment. 
38 As completely described below. 
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II. The Trial Court Incorrectly Granted Summary Judgment In Violation 
Of Lucky Seven 
Here, it does not matter whether or not the City's evidence, in its motion for 
summary judgment, may appear to be strong or even compelling pursuant to Lucky 
Seven. What does matter is that Petitioner presented the disputed material facts to 
the Court, 39 and it is inappropriate for the Court to weigh said disputed material facts 
in its summary judgment ruling pursuant to Lucky Seven. Said disputed material 
facts as presented by Petitioner are as follows: (a) a sufficient record exists to 
determine that Petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated, as more 4ilJ 
thoroughly explained in subsection "A", starting on page 28; (b) it is appropriate for 
the Court to apply the Lovell standard, as more thoroughly explained in subsection 
"B", starting on page 30; (c) the Waiver and other documents are invalid as they 
were not incorporated into the record, as more thoroughly explained in subsection 
"C", starting on page 31; ( d) Petitioner's plea is unknowing and involuntary since 
the waiver and other documents were not incorporated into the record, as more 
thoroughly explained in subsection "D", starting on page 33; (e) Petitioner's plea is 
still unknowing and involuntary in the event the Court inappropriately chooses to 
rely on the unincorporated Waiver, as more thoroughly explained in subsection "E", 
39 In addition to the disputed material fact that Petitioner's PCRA Petition was 
timely filed, as discussed above. 
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starting on page 34; and (f) the Court abused its discretion, as more thoroughly 
¼4) explained in subsection "F", starting on page 36. It is appropriate for the Appellate 
Court to review said disputed facts in a 1 ight most favorable to Petitioner, and if the 
Appellate Court concludes that there is a dispute to said material issues of fact, then 
the Court's summary judgment decision must be reversed pursuant to Lucky Seven. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: The Court Incorrectly Determined That Petitioner's PCRA 
Petition Was Untimely Pursuant To UCA § 78B-9-107 
It is appropriate for the Appellate Court to remand with instructions to the 
Court stating that Petitioner timely filed his PCRA Petition. 
The Gardner court held, 
"Broadly speaking, if a defendant's sentence or conviction is affirmed 
after direct appeal, or if no direct appeal is taken, the convicted person 
may pursue a post-conviction remedy by filing a petition under the 
PCRA." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,r 58,234 P.3d 1115. 
Here, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal for his underlying matter, and 
ther~fore, Petitioner properly filed his PCRA Petition pursuant to Gardner. 
I. Petitioner Satisfies The PCRA Procedural Bar 
The Gardner court describes the two PCRA time bars, i.e. the procedural bar 
and the limitations bar, wherein, under the procedural bar, 
"the petitioner may not seek relief based on grounds that may still be 
raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion, or on grounds that were 
already raised at trial or on direct appeal or could have been but [were] 
not raised at trial or on appeal. Relief is also precluded if the grounds 
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for relief asserted by the petitioner were raised and addressed in a prior 
post-conviction proceeding or if the grounds could have been, but 
[were] not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding," ( citations and 
quotations omitted). Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ~ 59, 234 P.3d 
1115. 
However, in relation to the PCRA procedural bar the Pinder court held, 
"Our cases establish that a defendant could have raised a claim when 
he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it. 
And that conclusion holds even when the defendant later discovers 
additional evidence providing further support for the claim," ( quotations 
omitted). Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ~ 44, 367 P.3d 968. 
The Lovell court held, 
"we held that because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11 ( e) 
... the law places the burden of establishing compliance with those 
requirements on the trial judge. The trial judge must fulfill the ... 
requirements imposed by [ rule 11 ( e) ] on the record before accepting 
the guilty plea. Although rule 11 ( e) does not require the judge to 
personally address the defendant regarding the rights the defendant is 
waiving, our cases impose a duty on the trial judge under rule 11 ( e) to 
determine that a defendant has been affirmatively advised of the rights 
he is waiving," ( citations and quotations omitted). State v. Lovell, 
2011 UT 36, ~ 12, 262 P.3d 803. 
Here, the Plea Court possessed the duty to comply with Rule 1 l(e) pursuant to 
Lovell. However, the Plea Court failed to comply with Rule 11 ( e ), thereby violating 
Petitioner's constitutional right to due process. Petitioner reasonably relied on the 
Plea Court's disposition of his matter as being appropriate and constitutionally valid. ll!J 
At no point did Petitioner have any reason to believe that the Plea Court violated his 
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constitutional right to due process because it failed to abide by Rule 11 ( e ). Petitioner 
@ reasonably relied on the Plea Court abiding by his constitutional right to due process 
As such, it is impossible for Petitioner to file an appeal, nor could he have 
raised a claim regarding the Plea Court's failure to comply with Rule 11 ( e ), because 
he was not aware of the essential factual basis for asserting it. Therefore, Petitioner 
overcomes the procedural bar pursuant to Pinder. 
II. Petitioner Satisfies The PCRA Limitations Bar 
The Gardner court held that the, 
"second procedural requirement, which we will refer to as the 
"limitations bar," establishes the time period within which new claims 
for relief must be raised. That is, even if a claim is not precluded by the 
procedural bar, a petitioner's claim for relief is barred if the petition is 
not timely filed. Under the PCRA, a petition for post-conviction relief 
must be filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued. By 
statute, the accrual date for the limitations bar is the latest date on which 
one of a number of specific milestones occur. Where the conviction is 
not challenged on appeal, the accrual date is the last day on which the 
direct appeal could have been filed. Where the conviction is challenged 
on direct appeal, the accrual date is the date that the appellate court 
decision is entered. Where certiorari review may be sought from either 
this court or the-United States Supreme Court, the accrual date occurs 
either on the last date for filing a petition for certiorari, if such a petition 
is not filed, or, if one is filed, on the date that petition is denied or 
otherwise decided. Finally, if evidentiary facts arise at a date later than 
all of the dates already described, the petitioner may file a petition 
within one year of the date that the petitioner "knew or should have 
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition_is based," (emphasis added). Gardner v. State: 2010 
UT 46, 1160-61, 234P.3d1115. 
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Thus, it is appropriate for the Court to disregard all of the PCRA accrual dates, 
except for the accrual date of UCA § 788-9-107(2)( e ), just as the Gardner court did 
because, in 1985, Ronnie Lee Gardner was convicted of first degree murder and 
sentenced to death. Nevertheless, Mr. Gardner could have brought a PCRA petition, 
15 years after his conviction, between September 1999 and September 2000 because 
Mr. Gardner became aware of new evidence. 
"The district court found that Mr. Gardner's due process and equal 
protection claims were untimely because the conclusion of federal court 
review was not the relevant date for the PCRA statute of limitations, but 
rather the relevant date was the day on which Mr. Gardner became 
aware he had newly developed mitigation evidence, which was 
presented to the federal magistrate judge in September 1999. The 
district court concluded that the PCRA required Mr. Gardner to have 
brought this claim by September 2000, one year after having discovered 
the evidence." Id. il 51. 
Similarly here, the applicable accrual date for the limitations bar is one year 
from when Petitioner became aware of the evidence demonstrating the Plea Court's ~ 
failure to abide by Rule 11 ( e) pursuant to Gardner. Since Petitioner reasonably 
relied on the Plea Court's ability to ensure that the disposition of his criminal matter 
was appropriate and constitutionally valid, there was no need for Petitioner to 
question whether or not the Plea Court complied with Rule 11 ( e ). Therefore, 
Petitioner acted diligently when he first became aware, on or about November 13, 
2015, when Petitioner's current counsel informed Petitioner that the Plea Court 
failed to comply with Rule 11 ( e ). 
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Therefore, the appropriate accrual date for Petitioner's PCRA petition is 
~ November 13, 2015. Accordingly Petitioner's window to timely file his PCRA 
petition lies between November 13, 2015 and November 13, 2016. As such, 
Petitioner's PCRA petition was timely filed. Therefore, Petitioner overcomes the 
PCRA limitations bar pursuant to Gardner. For all of the above reasons, it is 
appropriate for the Court to maintain and move forward with the above-captioned 
@ 
matter. 
"In 1985 Ronne Lee Gardner was convicted of first degree murder and 
sentenced to death."40 His PCRA history is as follows: 
1. Five ( 5) years after his conviction, "in 1990, Gardner filed his first 
post-conviction petition in the district court."41 
2. Fourteen (14) years after his conviction, an evidentiary hearing took 
place in 1999, which concluded that Mr. Gardner's trial counsel did 
not spend enough time preparing and explaining mitigating factor's 
regarding Mr. Gardner's mental health, thereby creating a new due 
process claim for Mr. Gardner. "Indeed, that evidence came into 
existence, in its current form, during an evidentiary hearing 
conducted by the federal magistrate judge. That hearing took place 
over the course of approximately ten days in September and October 
1999," 42 (hereinafter referred to as the "New Evidence"). 
3. Fifteen ( 15) years after his conviction, Mr. Gardner filed his, 
"second state petition for post-conviction relief, which he filed on 
40 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,I 1,234 P.3d 1115. 
41 Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, ,I 4, 94 P.3d 263. 
42 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,I 67,234 P.3d 1115. 
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May 12, 2000."43 Mr. Gardner failed to include the New Evidence 
in his second PCRA Petition. 
4. Twenty-five (25) years after his conviction, in 2010, Mr. Gardner 
files his third PCRA petition.44 Mr. Gardner included the New 
Evidence in his third PCRA Petition, wherein, Mr. Gardner 
incorrectly argued. that the tolling of the time period starts upon 
learning the legal significance of the new evidence, which occurred 
after the conclusion of the federal court review, which occurred 
shortly before the filing of his third PCRA petition.45 
5. "The district court found that Mr. Gardner's due process and equal 
protection claims were untimely because the conclusion of federal 
court review was not the relevant date for the PCRA statute of 
limitations, but rather the relevant date was the day on which Mr. 
Gardner became aware he had newly developed mitigation evidence, 
which was presented to the federal magistrate judge in September 
1999. The district court concluded that the PCRA required Mr. 
Gardner to have brought this claim by September 2000, one year 
after having discovered the evidence."46 
6. The Gardner court confirmed the district court's ruling, and held, 
"Because Mr. Gardner became aware of this evidence in 1999, he 
had an opportunity to raise issues related to the evidence in his 
second state petition for post-conviction relief. Because he did not 
do so, his claims are now precluded by the procedural bar of the 
PCRA. From this conclusion, it necessarily follows that Mr. 
Gardner's due process claims are also precluded by the limitations 
bar of the PCRA. That is, because the claims could have been raised 
in 2000; they also could have been raised more than one year before 
Mr. Gardner filed this petition."47 
43 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,i 68, 234 P.3d 1115. 
44 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,I 1,234 P.3d 1115. 
45 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,I,I 72-75, 234 P.3d 1115. 
46 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ,I 51,234 P.3d 1115. 
47 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 76, ,I 51,234 P.3d 1115. 
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7. The Gardner court also held, 
"Broadly speaking, if a defendant's sentence or conviction is 
affirmed after direct appeal, or if no direct appeal is taken, the 
convicted person may pursue a post-conviction remedy by filing a 
petition under the PCRA."48 
Therefore, in order to recap, the following issues are highlighted. The term 
"new evidence" does not mean completely new evidence that is discovered after trial 
G, for the first time. As Gardner points out, Mr. Gardner's trial counsel's failure to 
appropriately present the New Evidence occurred during Mr. Gardner's trial in 1985. 
What is important for PCRA purposes is that Mr. Gardner first became aware of the 
New Evidence fourteen (14) years after his conviction in 1999. As such both the 
district and appellate courts held that Mr. Gardner could have timely filed a second 
PCRA petition within one year of becoming aware of the New Evidence. 
Gardner is buttressed by Brown. The Brown court holds that the PCRA time 
bar is triggered upon the, "actual or imputed discovery of the evidentiary facts 
supporting the petition," and not when a petitioner "recognizes their legal 
~ significance. "49 Mr. Brown was sentenced on March 31, 2011. 50 However, Mr. 
Brown "does not claim that he was unaware of these facts [that formed the basis of 
his PCRA petition] when he pied guilty. Indeed, he concedes that he 'may have 
48 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 76, ,I 58,234 P.3d 1115. 
49 Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, ,I 10,361 P.3d 124. 
50 Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, ,I 2,361 P.3d 124. 
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known of these basic facts at the time of sentencing."'51 As such, Mr. Brown's 
tolling period for PCRA purposes began on March 31, 2011, i.e., the time when he 
became "aware of the evidence."52 Therefore, Mr. Brown had until March 31, 2012 
to timely file his PCRA petition. 
However, Mr. Brown Gust as Mr. Gardner), untimely filed his PCRA petition 
on November 25, 2013, when he became aware of the legal significance of the facts 
that formed the basis of his PCRA petition.53 Therefore, the Brown comi correctly 
held that Mr. Brown's PCRA Petition was untimely. 
In its recent holding, the Utah Supreme Court continues to support the 
Gardner and Brown rulings, when it held, in relation to the PCRA time bar that, 
"Our cases establish that a defendant 'could have" raised a claim when 
he or his counsel is aware of the essential factual basis for asserting 
it. ,,,54 
Here, Petitioner timely filed his PCRA petition pursuant to Gardner, Brown, 
and Pinder. Petitioner did not file an appeal, however, pursuant to Gardner, an 
appeal is not required in order to file a PCRA petition.55 In Gardner, Mr. Gardner 
first became aware of a due process violation, via an investigation by a federal court, 
51 Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, ,r 11, 361 P.3d 124. 
·2 
' Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 76, ,r 51,234 P.3d 1115. 
53 Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, ,r 4, 361 P.3d 124. 
54 Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ,r 44, 367 P.3d 968. 
55 Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 76, ,r 58,234 P.3d 1115. 
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fourteen (14) years after his conviction. Similarly here, Petitioner first became 
aware of a due process violation, via an investigation by current counsel, nine (9) 
years after his conviction. 
What is important for PCRA timeliness purposes is the actual date a petitioner 
first becomes aware of new evidence that forms the basis of the PCRA petition. In 
Gardner, both the district and appellate courts correctly held that Mr. Gardner could 
have timely filed a second PCRA petition within one year that Mr. Gardner became 
aware of the New Evidence. In other words, Mr. Gardner could have timely brought 
a second PCRA petition based on the New Evidence between 1999 and 2000. 
Here, Petitioner does not concede that he was aware of the facts that form the 
<ii9 basis of his PCRA petition at the time of his conviction and sentence. This is in 
stark contrast to Brown, because Mr. Brown did make such a concession. Here, 
/;,:11 
'<'llfl 
Petitioner states that he first became aware of the new evidence that forms the basis 
of his appeal on November 13, 2015. Therefore, Petitioner timely filed his PCRA 
petition from the date he became "aware of the essential factual basis for asserting 
it."56 For all of the above reasons, it is appropriate for the Appellate Court to remand 
with instructions to the Court that Petitioner's PCRA Petition is timely filed. 
56 
-Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56, ~ 44,367 P.3d 968. 
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POINT TWO: The Trial Court Incorrectly Granted Summary Judgment 
In Violation Of Lucky Seven 
The Lucky Seven court held, 
"In reviewing a summary judgment, we apply the analytical standard 
required of the trial court. We liberally construe the facts and view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. 
Moreover, because a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, we are free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusion. After reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
appellant, if we conclude there is a dispute as to a material issue of fact, 
we must reverse the trial court's determination and remand for trial on 
that issue. It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts 
in ruling on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on 
one side may appear to be strong or even compelling. One sworn 
statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the 
entry of summary judgment," ( citations and quotations). Lucky Seven 
Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
It is appropriate for the Appellate Court to remand with instructions to the 
reverse its Summary Judgment ruling because Petitioner provided disputed 
material facts that requires the City's motion for summary judgment to be denied. 
I. The Trial Court Failed To Review The Facts In The Light Most 
Favorable To Petitioner For Summary Judgment Purposes, In Violation Giv 
Of Lucky Seven 
It is appropriate for the Appellate Court to review the following disputed facts 
in a light most favorable to Petitioner, and if the Appellate Court concludes that there ~ 
is a dispute to said material issues of fact, then the Court's summary judgment 
decision must be reversed pursuant to Lucky Seven. 
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A. A Sufficient Record Exists To Determine That Petitioner's 
Constitutional Right To Due Process Was Violated 
After serving 8 years in State Prison, the Whetton defendant argued that he 
should be released, "mainly on the basis of his own self-serving asse1iions, that he 
was not accorded due process of law nor given a fair trial." Whetton v. Turner, 497 
P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1972). The Whetton court held, "Upon the basis of the record 
@ before us it is not made to appear that there is any likelihood that anything of that 
character exists in this case," primarily on the basis that the defendant was unable to 
procure a transcript. Id. at 858. 
However, the Whetton court held, 
"We do not desire to be so arbitrary as to say that in no instance would 
the lack of a transcript be deemed of critical importance. Common sense 
as to what fairness and justice demand should be applied to the 
circumstances shown. If it appears that there is any reasonable 
likelihood that there was some substantial failure to accord the accused 
the protections our law affords, or that there may have been a 
miscarriage of justice, such as, for example, where there may have been 
some chicanery or connivance to convict one innocent of crime, or a 
case of obvious mistaken identity, or some other such circumstance that 
it wo-µld be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction, 
then the best possible effort should be made to reconstruct the record 
and ascertain just what occurred." Id. 
Similarly, here, there is a reasonable likelihood that there was some 
substantial failure to accord Petitioner the protections our law affords him, 
specifically the violation of his right to due process. Therefore the best possible 
~ efforts should be made to reconstruct the record and ascertain just what occurred. 
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As is the case here, the defendant in Walker also argued that his constitutional 
right to due process was violated because he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and 
involuntarily. The Walker court determined that such a claim warrants the court's 
best possible effort to reconstruct the record, without a transcript. 
"No transcript exists for this proceeding; however, the record does 
contain the trial court's minute entry of the hearing. The court's minutes 
indicate that Defendant was advised of his rights and the consequences 
of entering into a guilty plea." State v. Walker, 2013 UT App 198, ,r 4, 
308 P.3d 573; see also RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, UT App 290, 
Notes 1 & 2, 263 P.3d 1152 ("However, our review of this hearing is 
limited to the applicable minute entry because a transcript of the hearing 
was not included in the appellate record. Again, the Ellisons have not 
provided a transcript of this March 5 hearing, and thus, our review of 
what occurred during this hearing is limited to the trial court's minute 
entry, order, and findings of fact" 
The'Walker court determined that the defendant entered a knowing and 
voluntary plea based on the trial court's minute entry and because the defendant, 
"failed to identify any other document in the record revealing a 
significant departure by the plea-taking court from the rule 11 ( e) 
requirements that would create doubt that Defendant's plea was 
anything other than knowing and voluntary." Id. ,r 38. 
Here, through no fault of Petitioner, a transcript is not available because the 
Plea Court was not in the practice of recording its hearings during the course of 
Petitioner's case.57 Nevertheless, Petitioner provides numerous documents that 
reveal a significant departure by the Plea Court from the Rule 11 ( e) requirements, 
57 The Plea Court currently does record its hearings. 
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including but not limited to the Request For Your Case To Be Called (the 
(.j "Waiver"),58 the court docket, 59 and the lack of an Information.60 Said documents 
create doubt that Petitioner's plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary. 
Accordingly: ( l) it is inappropriate for the Court to assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below because the Plea Court's documents provide sufficient doubt that 
Petitioner's plea was anything other than knowing and voluntary; (2) a sufficient 
record exists that demonstrates Petitioner's unconstitutional plea; and (3) it is 
appropriate for the Court to make its best possible effort to reconstruct the record 
and ascertain just what occurred with the remaining available record. 
B. It Is Appropriate For The Court To Apply The Lovell Standard To 
This Matter 
The Lovell comt determined that after Rule 11(1) became effective on April 1, 
2005, a petitioner must meet the following two prongs in order to withdraw a guilty 
plea: ( 1) the plea-court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 ( e ); and (2) the 
defendant's plea was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily. State v. Lovell, 
<@ 2011 UT 36, ,r 20, 262 P.3d 803. Here, Petitioner entered his guilty plea on 
February 27, 2007, and thus he must demonstrate both prongs. 
58 Please refer to the copies of the English translation of the Waiver and its Spanish 
original at pages 35-45 of the record. 
59 Please refer to a copy of the court docket at pages 23-28 of the record. 
60 Petitioner requested a copy of the court file, where, upon receipt of the copy of 
the court file, an Information was not included. 
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C. The Waiver And Other Documents Are Invalid As They Were Not 
Incorporated Into The Record 
If a court uses a waiver/affidavit to fulfill the plea colloquy, Rule 1 l(e) 
requirements, 
"The trial judge should then review the statements in the affidavit with 
the defendant, question the defendant concerning his understanding of it 
... on the record before accepting the guilty plea ... This procedure may 
take additional time, but constitutional rights may not be sacrificed in 
the name of judicial economy. The procedure outlined is designed to 
assist trial judges in making the constitutionally required determination 
that the defendant's plea is truly knowing and voluntary and will tend to 
discourage, or at least facilitate swift disposition of, post-conviction 
attacks on the validity of guilty pleas because the trial judge will have 
produced a clearly adequate record for review." State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309, 1314(Utah 1987). 
The Lehi court reiterated the proper incorporation rule by stating, 
"that defendant's affidavit was not properly incorporated into the record 
because the trial court made no inquiry into whether defendant had read, 
understood, and acknowledged the affidavit," ( citations and quotations 
omitted). State v. Lehi, UT App 212, ~ 9, 73 P.3d 985. 
Here, the Plea Court relied on the Waiver61 in order to ensure that Petitioner's 
plea was knowing and voluntary. However, there is no evidence on the record that 
demonstrates that the Plea Court made an inquiry as to whether Petitioner had read, 
understood, and acknowledged the Waiver as required by Gibbons and Lehi. This is 
61 Please refer to the copies of the English translation of the Waiver and its Spanish 
original at pages 35-45 of the record. 
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further corroborated via Petitioner's Affidavit.62 Therefore, it is inappropriate for the 
I@ Court to use the Waiver in order to demonstrate that Petitioner was aware of any 
aspect of Rule l l(e) prior to pleading guilty because the Waiver was never 
incorporated into the record. 
The Lovell court stated, 
"although a variety of sources may be used to show that the defendant 
was informed of his rights, those sources must be incorporated into the 
record in the same manner as a plea affidavit. That is, the record must 
reflect that those documents were read and understood by the 
defendant.'' State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, if 16,262 P.3d 803. 
Here, the February 27, 2007 comi docket note states that, "def advsd of rule 
11 and signed waiver." However, the record fails to demonstrate that Plea Court 
@ asked Petitioner if he had read, understood, and acknowledged the February 27, 2007 
court docket note. This is further corroborated via Petitioner's Affidavit.63 
~ Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Comi to use the court docket, or any other 
document that the Plea Court failed to incorporate into the record, in order to 
demonstrate that Petitioner was aware of his Rule 11 ( e) rights prior to pleading 
guilty. 
62 Please refer to Petitioner's Affidavit at pages 30-31 of the record. 
63 Please refer to Petitioner's Affidavit at pages 30-31 of the record. 
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However, in the event that that Court inappropriately relies on said court 
docket note it is still insufficient for Rule 11 ( e) purposes because the Gibbons court 
found that the 
"form included in the record in this case is inadequate, being nothing 
more than a form with boxes for the trial judge to check denoting "The 
defendant acknowledges receiving a copy of the information and the 
same was read to him" (in this case, the information was not read); 
"Defendant is advised of his/her rights"; and "Plea is determined to be 
voluntary." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1314 at note 4, (Utah 
1987). 
Just as the Gibbons court found that the "form ... is inadequate, being nothing 
more than a form with boxes for the trial judge to check denoting . . . Defendant is 
advised of his/her rights," it is appropriate for the Court to find the same, i.e., the 
court docket note is inadequate especially since the Plea Court did not create the 
court docket. In Gibbons, the form was at least checked and signed by the court. In 
stark contrast, here, Plea Court did not check nor sign the court docket thereby 
making it inappropriate for the Court rely on the court docket in any fashion 
pursuant to Gibbons. 
D. Petitioner's Plea Is Unknowing And Involuntary Since The Waiver 
And Other Documents Were Not Incorporated Into The Record 
As a result of the Plea Court's failure to incorporate the Waiver, court docket, 
and Information into the record, it is inappropriate for the Court to rely on said 
documents in order to ascertain whether or not Petitioner pied knowingly and 
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voluntarily. Therefore, there is no evidence on the record demonstrating that the 
\id Plea Court abided by Rule l l(e). 
Accordingly, Petitioner meets the two-prong Lovell standard because: (1) the 
Plea Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 ( e )( 1-8); and (2) said failure 
constitutes an unknowing and involuntary plea pursuant to Lovell, Alexander, and 
Nicholls infra, thereby making it appropriate for the Court to vacate Petitioner's 
conviction and withdraw his guilty plea, nunc pro tune, as a result of the violation of 
his constitutional right to due process. 
E. Petitioner's Plea Is Still Unknowing And Involuntary In The Event 
The Court Inappropriately Chooses To Rely On The 
Unincorporated Waiver 
a. The Plea Court Failed To Explain The Consequences Of 
Petitioner's Plea In Violation Of Rule ll{e)(5)64 
Here, the Waiver65 provides a table with potential jail time and potential fine 
associated with different misdemeanors. However, the Waiver fails to distinguish 
whether or not Petitioner will be facing: (I) solely a jail sentence; (2) solely a fine; 
or (3) a jail sentence along with a fine. As such the Plea Court fails to inform 
Petitioner of the possible consequence of his plea in violation of Rule l l(e)(5). The 
Knowlden court states, 
64 Please refer to the copy of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 ( e) 
(2007), at pages 4 7-49 of the record. 
65 Please refer to the copies of the English translation of the Waiver and its Spanish 
original at pages 35-45 of the record. 
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"a plea is knowing and voluntary if it is made with sufficient awareness 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." State v. 
Knowlden, 2013 UT App 63, ,r 3,298 P.3d 691. 
As such, Petitioner successfully meets both prongs of the Lovell standard 
because: (1) the Plea Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 1 l(e)(5) by not 
explaining the consequences of the plea to Petitioner; and (2) said failure constitutes 
an unknowing and involuntary plea pursuant to Knowlden. Therefore, it is 
appropriate for the Court to vacate Petitioner's conviction, and allow him to 
withdraw his no contest plea, nunc pro tune. 
b. The Plea Court Failed To Explain The Criminal Elements In 
Violation Of Rule ll{e)(4)(A)66 
Here, the Waiver67 fails to state the elements of the charged crime, in violation 
of Rule l l(e)(4)(A). The Alexander court held, 
"Because a review of the record does not demonstrate that [defendant] 
was informed of or understood the essential elements of the ... charge 
... we therefore conclude that [defendant's] plea was unknowingly and 
involuntarily made, and we hold that [ defendant] has made the showing 
necessary to withdraw his guilty plea." State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 
27, ,r 37, 279 P.3d 371. 
As such, Petitioner successfully meets both prongs of the Lovell standard 
because: (I) the Plea Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 1 l(e)(4)(A) by not 
stating the elements of the charged crime; and (2) said failure constitutes an 
66 Please refer to the copy of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 ( e) 
~2007), at pages 4 7-49 of the record. 
7 Please refer to the copies of the English translation of the Waiver and its Spanish 
original at pages 35-45 of the record. 
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unknowing and involuntary plea pursuant to Alexander. Therefore, it is appropriate 
(@ for the Coui1 to vacate Petitioner's conviction, and allow him to withdraw his no 
contest plea, nunc pro tune. 
c. The Plea Court Failed To Explain The Factual Basis For the 
Plea In Violation Of Rule ll(e)(4)(B)68 
Here, the Waiver69 fails to explain the factual basis for the plea in violation of 
Rule ll(e)(4)(B). The Nicholls court held, 
"A knowing and voluntary plea is one that has a factual basis for the 
plea and ensures that the defendant understands and waives his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, 
and the right to confront witnesses." Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, ~ 
20, 203 P.3d 976. 
As such, Petitioner successfully meets both prongs of the Lovell standard 
because: ( 1) the Plea Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 ( e )( 4 )(B) by failing 
to explain the factual basis for the plea; and (2) said failure constitutes an unknowing 
and involuntary plea pursuant to Nicholls. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court 
to vacate Petitioner's conviction, and allow him to withdraw his no contest plea, 
(,;j nunc pro tune. 
F. The Court Abused Its Discretion 
The Nicholls court stated, 
68 Please refer to the copy of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 ( e) 
(2007), at pages 47-49 of the record. 
69 Please refer to the copies of the English translation of the Waiver and its Spanish 
original at pages 35-45 of the record. 
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"A guilty plea is not valid under the Due Process Clause of the United 
States Constitution unless it is knowing and voluntary," ( citations and 
quotations omitted). Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12,120,203 P.3d 976; 
see also State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 1 16,279 P.3d 371 ("A guilty 
plea involves the waiver of several constitutional rights and is therefore 
valid under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution only if it is 
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently," ( citations and 
quotations omitted)). 
Here, Petitioner's constitutional right to due process was violated because the 
Plea Court failed strictly comply with Rule 11 ( e ), thereby making his pl<ta 
unknowingly and involuntarily as more thoroughly described above. Accordingly, 
the Court abused its discretion by failing to grant Petitioner's requested relief.70 
II. The Court Failed To Consider Appellant's Affidavit, For Summary 
Judgment Purposes, In Violation Of Lucky Seven 
The Lucky Seven court held, 
"One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, 
precluding the entry of summary judgment," ( citations and quotations). 
Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988). 
It is appropriate for the Appellate Court to remand with instructions to the 
Court to reverse its summary judgment ruling because Petitioner provided a sworn 
70 "if the trial court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in taking the defendant's guilty plea, and subsequently denies 
the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court has exceeded its pennitted range of 
discretion as a matter of law." State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819,821 (Utah App. 1995). <i,;, 
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statement, via his Affidavit,71 which disputes the City's averments which creates an 
@ issue of fact, and thereby precludes the Court's entry of summary judgment pursuant 
to Lucky Seven. For all of the above reasons, it is appropriate for the Appellate 
Court to remand with instructions to the Court to deny the City's motion for 
summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays the Appellate Court to: (1) remand with 
instructions to the Court that Petitioner timely filed his PCRA Petition; (2) remand 
with instructions to the Court to deny the City's motion for summary judgment; 
and (3) provide Petitioner with any and all other relief that the Appellate Court 
@ deems appropriate, equitable, and proper. 
[;]\ .. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Rule 24(a)(l 1). 
DATED this 17th day of January, 2017. 
<@ 71 Please refer to pages 30-31 of the record. 
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